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A R T I C L E S

Greenhouse Gas
Regulation Under
the Clean Air Act:
Structure, Effects,
and Implications
of a Knowable
Pathway
by Nathan Richardson, Art Fraas, and
Dallas Burtraw
Nathan Richardson is a resident scholar, Art
Fraas is a visiting scholar, and Dallas Burtraw is
a senior fellow at Resources for the Future.

Editors’ Summary
Absent legislative intervention, CAA regulation of GHGs
is moving beyond mobile sources to the industrial and
power facilities that emit significant U.S. GHG emissions. The authors analyze the mechanisms available to
EPA for regulating such sources, and identify one, NSPS,
as the most predictable, likely, and practical, i.e., knowable, pathway. Indeed, EPA announced in late 2010 that
it intends to pursue this pathway. Based on the legal
structure of the NSPS and EPA’s traditional approach,
the authors analyze a hypothetical GHG NSPS for one
sector, coal electricity-generation. This analysis indicates
that efficiency improvements and perhaps biomass cofiring could be implemented through the NSPS, yielding
modest but meaningful emissions reductions. Trading
could also rein in costs. Though analysis is limited to one
sector and does not include modeling of costs, it suggests
that CAA regulation, though inferior to comprehensive
climate legislation, could be a useful tool for regulating
stationary source GHGs.

U

ntil late 2009, most observers considered it likely
that the U.S. Congress would pass some form of
comprehensive climate legislation, including an
economywide cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gases
(GHGs). That did not happen in 2009—though the U.S.
House of Representatives passed such a bill (WaxmanMarkey, H.R. 2454), the U.S. Senate did not. It is now
unclear when, or even if, Congress will pass any comprehensive legislation.
This legislative inertia has resulted in a shift in interest
to actions by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to regulate GHGs under its existing Clean Air Act
(CAA)1 authority. Under President Barack Obama, EPA
has proposed and finalized rules requiring the reporting of
GHG emissions and an “endangerment finding” that permits and requires the regulation of GHG emissions from
cars and trucks (mobile sources, in CAA terminology).
This endangerment finding was followed by the recent EPA
announcement of new GHG emissions standards for these
mobile sources.
The steps EPA will take as it moves to regulate mobilesource emissions are relatively well understood. Substantial
uncertainty remains, however, over how EPA will use its
CAA authority to regulate stationary sources—the power
plants and industrial facilities responsible for the majority
of U.S. GHG emissions; particularly existing, unmodified sources. A recent settlement agreement provides some
broad clarity, but details remain obscure.
This Article attempts to resolve some of that uncertainty
by analyzing a set of plausible pathways EPA may use to
regulate stationary-source GHG emissions under the CAA.
Section III describes each of these pathways, and Section
IV offers evidence that points to one program in particular,
the new source performance standards (NSPS), as the most
likely, predictable, and practical vehicle for CAA regulation of GHGs. In short, the NSPS are the knowable pathway for regulation of GHGs under the CAA.
Author’s Note: This Article was written and released for discussion
in April of 2010, and accepted for publication in October of the
same year. In December 2010, EPA announced terms of a settlement
agreement with plaintiff states in which the Agency agreed to
implement new source performance standards (NSPS) for certain
classes of greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters beginning in 2011. This
confirms the broad predictions made in this Article. The Agency has
not begun the rulemaking process or released any details regarding
these GHG NSPS, however. This Article therefore serves both to
explain the legal and policy justifications for the regulatory path
apparently chosen by the Agency and to predict the specifics of that
path. The authors appreciate the assistance of Erin Mastrangelo, and
funding from Mistra’s Climate Policy Research Forum (Clipore).
1.	
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EPA could choose from a variety of specific measures
under its general NSPS authority, with increasing stringency and reach across existing stationary sources. These
measures range from performance standards that vary in
stringency and are defined over relatively narrow categories
of emissions sources to more flexible standards that allow
some form of trading to achieve compliance with an average performance standard. It is also possible that the NSPS
program could be used as a vehicle to introduce a sectorbased cap-and-trade program.
In Section V, we assess the magnitude of emissions
reductions that could be achieved under the most modest of the possible approaches outlined in Section IV. We
examine only coal-fired electricity-generating units, but
within this single, narrowly defined class of emitters, we
discuss regulatory options that could achieve emissions
reductions equivalent to roughly 3% of total U.S. emissions at what we believe would be modest cost and with
minimal disruption to current capacity use. Although we
do not explore the more expansive options here, substantially greater reductions would be possible from NSPS for
other source categories, such as petroleum and gas refineries, more stringent performance standards, and/or from
trading across source categories that would allow for substitution from coal to natural gas. An analysis of the costs
and emissions reductions of all of these measures would
require modeling that is beyond the scope of this Article.
In discussing an NSPS approach, we do not intend to
present it as the ideal or even necessarily preferable pathway for controlling GHG emissions. New, comprehensive
climate change legislation from Congress would provide a
superior alternative. It is also possible that other pathways
under the existing CAA could produce better emissions
results, could achieve results at lower cost, might be more
likely to survive legal or political challenges, or could otherwise constitute a better approach for EPA. In our analysis
of possible GHG NSPS pathways, we are careful to point
out both the associated advantages and the disadvantages.
Rather than advocating for NSPS regulation of GHGs, our
goal is to offer an analysis of what appears to us to be the
most likely route for EPA to choose. Some studies from
EPA 2 and from academic sources3 discuss the pathways

that are available to EPA in general terms, but few if any
discuss any of those pathways in depth. It is this gap that
we aim to begin to fill with this Article.
We argue that a modest GHG regulatory program
under existing CAA NSPS authority could be effective
without deviating greatly from traditional EPA practice
under this authority. We further find that such a program
could achieve meaningful emissions reductions in the electricity sectors (and potentially elsewhere, though we do not
study other sectors). Although a more detailed empirical
exercise is necessary to fully determine the costs of regulation, it is our sense that a modest regulatory approach is
unlikely to impose large costs. Moreover, the inclusion of
emissions trading mechanisms could probably be used to
reduce the costs of more stringent regulation even under
the CAA, although such mechanisms would probably be
limited to individual sectors of the economy.

2.	

A.

See generally Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44354, 44476520 (July 30, 2008) (hereinafter ANPR).
3.	 See, e.g., Larry Parker & James E. McCarthy, Congressional Research
Service, Climate Change: Potential Regulation of Stationary
Greenhouse Gas Sources Under the Clean Air Act, Report R40585
(2009), at 1; Inimai M. Chettiar & Jason A. Schwartz, New York University School of Law, The Road Ahead: EPA’s Options and Obligations for Regulating Greenhouse Gases (2009), at v, http://www.policyintegrity.org/publications/documents/TheRoadAhead.pdf; Timothy
Mullins & Michael Rhead Enion, (If ) Things Fall Apart: Searching for Optimal Regulatory Solutions to Combating Climate Change Under Title I of the
Existing Clean Air Act if Congressional Action Fails, 40 ELR 10864, 10881
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I.

A Brief Overview of the CAA and
GHGs

Until and unless Congress enacts legislation that changes
EPA authority, the existing CAA gives EPA authority to
regulate GHG emissions.4 Furthermore, EPA has already
begun to regulate GHGs from some sources under that
statute. Understanding how EPA may regulate GHG emissions, therefore, requires at least a basic understanding of
the CAA.
The CAA is a massive, complex regulatory statute with
a wide variety of interconnected programs covering different types of pollutants. The principal division within the
statute is between the regulation of stationary emissions
sources (power plants, industrial facilities, and so forth),
primarily under Title I, and mobile emissions sources
(vehicles and vehicle engines) under Title II. In the past
year, EPA has moved quickly toward the regulation of
GHGs from mobile sources, but has provided only a limited discussion of regulation of stationary-source GHGs.
Because stationary sources emit the majority of GHGs in
the United States, how EPA chooses to regulate them is by
far the most significant open question in any analysis of the
Agency’s GHG regulatory efforts.

The Regulatory Process so Far

Although our focus in this Article is on stationary-source
regulation, the story of EPA regulation of GHGs begins
with, and to date has been dominated by, mobile-source
(Sept. 2010); Roger Martella & Matthew Paulson, Regulation of Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, Daily Env’t Rep., Mar. 9,
2009, at 1.
4.	 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29, 37 ELR 20075 (2007).
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regulation. The most recent and significant moves by the
Agency toward GHG regulation are the December 2009
endangerment finding under §202 of the CAA5 and subsequent regulation of mobile sources through fleet emissions
standards for vehicle manufacturers.6 The endangerment
finding—and the long series of steps leading up to it,
including the well-known Massachusetts v. EPA decision by
the Supreme Court7—did not directly impose any regulation of stationary sources. However, EPA’s recent action
establishing GHG emissions limits for cars and trucks will
lead to stationary source regulation through the CAA permitting programs and, most likely, through the NSPS provisions of the Act.

1.

The Foundation—Massachusetts v. EPA

EPA action on GHGs under the CAA, and in
particular its focus to date on mobile sources,
has been driven by the Supreme Court case that
forced the Agency to consider regulating GHGs,
Massachusetts.8 That case was filed by states
with a narrow claim—that EPA must regulate
mobile-source GHGs. The Supreme Court ruled
that GHGs are pollutants under the CAA and,
thus, that the Agency is required to determine
whether GHGs emitted from vehicles endanger
public health or welfare (or at least explain why
it would or could not do so).9 The December
2009 endangerment finding therefore fulfills
the Court’s mandate from Massachusetts. No
equivalent judicial mandate exists for the regulation of stationary sources.
Massachusetts and the regulatory steps undertaken by EPA in response are not, however,
irrelevant to an analysis of the regulation of
stationary sources. The critical finding by the
Court that, contrary to EPA’s position at the
time, GHGs are “pollutants” for purposes of the CAA,10
makes the regulation of stationary sources possible. EPA
must therefore eventually consider the regulation of stationary-source GHG emissions, even if the Court decision
does not explicitly instruct it to do so.11

5.	

See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Dec. 15,
2009).
6.	 See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0472 (to be
published in the Federal Register), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/ldv-ghg-final-rule.pdf.
7.	 549 U.S. 497, 37 ELR 20075 (2007).
8.	 Id.
9.	 Id. at 533-35.
10. Id. at 528-29.
11. Id. at 533-35.

2.
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The CAA Process: From Endangerment to
Regulation

Nearly all of the regulatory programs in the CAA follow
a similar process. EPA first identifies emissions of a pollutant from a set of sources. It then undertakes an analysis of
whether these emissions present a danger to “public health
or welfare,” generally a purely science-based determination. If, based on this analysis, the Agency concludes that
a pollutant endangers public health or welfare, this endangerment finding is both a threshold requirement and a trigger—it is both necessary and sufficient for the Agency to
regulate. The Agency retains some discretion over exactly
how to regulate in the wake of an endangerment finding,
but it does not have the option of refusing to regulate at all.

Chart 1 shows how this process has happened so far
for GHG regulation and how it will continue to unfold.
The decisions made and steps taken by EPA to date show
how the Agency is well on its way to regulating mobilesource emissions. As discussed above, Massachusetts set the
regulatory process into motion, primarily by determining
that GHGs are pollutants within the scope of the CAA.
Since that case, EPA has moved to regulate mobile-source
emissions with the recent endangerment finding for such
sources and the joint EPA and U.S. Department of Transportation rule regulating mobile-source GHG emissions
issued in March 2010.12

12. See Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74
Fed. Reg. 49454 (Sept. 28, 2009); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, supra
note 6.
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Agency Discretion

Future possible regulatory actions that might be pursued
to regulate stationary sources are illustrated in the remainder of Chart 1. The major uncertainty is which of the several CAA regulatory programs for stationary sources EPA
will select.
Most of those who have studied the process of EPA regulation of GHGs under the CAA have explicitly or implicitly assumed that EPA has discretion to choose among
these programs. This is not necessarily the case, however.
Nathan Richardson13 and others argue that interconnections among different sections of the CAA (and, therefore,
different regulatory programs) may limit EPA’s discretion.
Steps that the Agency has already taken or will soon take
may foreclose certain regulatory options and/or compel
others.14 EPA admits that this kind of triggering occurs
between some programs (most notably that regulation of
mobile sources triggers a permitting process for stationary
sources, as discussed in Section III.C. below), but claims
to have general discretion to choose among regulatory programs for stationary sources.15
Here, we assume that EPA has broad discretion to
choose among CAA regulatory programs, and that the
Agency’s goal is to regulate GHGs under the CAA as
efficiently as possible (to achieve the greatest emissions
reductions at the lowest cost). The goal in this Article is
to examine plausible candidates for such an ideal CAA
GHG regulatory scheme.

II.

Stationary Source Regulation Under
the CAA

Stationary source regulation under the CAA comes in
three forms: air quality standards; technology standards;
and permits for new and modified sources. Most (but
not all) of these programs involve some split of regulatory
authority between federal and state governments, termed
cooperative federalism. The CAA has also traditionally
been a command-and-control statute, but amendments in
1977 and 1990 and EPA actions over the same time period
have brought the limited application of incentive-based
approaches to some aspects of CAA regulation. A substan-

13. Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act:
Does Chevron v. NRDC Set EPA Free?, 29 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 283 (2010).
14. For example, two environmental groups, the Center for Biological Diversity and 350.org, have petitioned EPA, claiming that the Agency is legally
required to regulate GHGs under the national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS) program. See Center for Biological Diversity and 350.org, Petition to Establish National Pollution Limits for Greenhouse Gases Pursuant
to the Clean Air Act (Dec. 2, 2009), at 15, available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/global_warming_litigation/clean_air_act/pdfs/Petition_GHG_pollution_cap_12-2-2009.pdf.
Nathan Richardson, supra note 13, writes that such challenges stand a significant chance of success in the courts.
15. See ANPR, supra note 2 (stating that “we explore three major pathways
that the CAA provides for regulating stationary sources, as well as other
stationary source authorities of the Act, and their potential applicability to
GHGs”).
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tial portion of our analysis will be dedicated to whether and
how such approaches might be implemented for GHGs.

A.

Air Quality Standards

Air quality standards are the core regulatory mechanism
in the CAA. The primary vehicle for such standards, the
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), is the
most well-known program in the statute and the source
of much of its regulatory impact. However, the standards
have some conceptual inconsistencies and practical implementation problems that make them less than ideal for the
regulation of GHGs.

1.

NAAQS

In the NAAQS program, as the name implies, a single
air quality standard for each regulated pollutant is set for
the entire country. The goal of the ensuing regulation is
to ensure that areas that fail to attain this standard (nonattainment areas) are brought into compliance, and that
areas in which the standard is currently met (attainment
areas) continue to do so in the future. The NAAQS program is governed by §§108-110 of the CAA.16
NAAQS regulatory responsibilities are divided between
EPA and state governments—the NAAQS program is
the primary example of the CAA’s cooperative federalism
approach. EPA is responsible for listing pollutants to be regulated under the program and for setting NAAQS themselves, whereas states are responsible for on-the-ground
regulation of emitters to comply with the standards.
The regulatory process for NAAQS is as follows. First,
EPA must determine whether a given pollutant endangers
public health or welfare—this is the NAAQS endangerment finding, analogous but not identical to that required
for mobile sources.17 Pollutants for which a positive endangerment finding has been made are listed as criteria pollutants and the Agency must determine what air quality
standard is necessary to protect public health or welfare.18
In principle, the Agency could set separate standards to
protect health and welfare—these are termed primary
(health) and secondary (welfare) standards.19 In practice,
however, EPA almost never does this, and the only difference between the two types of standard is that the CAA
does not include a timeline for compliance with secondary standards.20 Both of these initial determinations—
endangerment and the level at which a NAAQS is set—are
designated in the CAA as purely scientific.21 EPA is not
permitted to consider compliance costs.22 To date, EPA has
set a NAAQS for only six pollutants: sulfur dioxide (SO2);
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

CAA §108(b).
CAA §108(a).
CAA §109(a).
CAA §109(a)(1)-(2).
CAA §172(a)(2)(A).
CAA §§108(a), 109(a).
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 486, 31 ELR 20152
(2001).
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tropospheric ozone; nitrogen oxides (NOx); particulate matter (PM; two particle sizes are regulated separately); lead; and carbon monoxide.23
Once a NAAQS has been set, states are
responsible for compliance; EPA retains significant oversight, however. States must document
how they plan to comply with the standards in
state implementation plans (SIPs), which EPA
must approve.24 Each plan must illustrate how
an area will come into compliance with the (primary) NAAQS within five years, though EPA
can extend that period to 10 years.25 In practice,
EPA may create a model plan that states can adopt
with the knowledge that it will be approved by the
Agency, though they are free in principle to deviate from the model as long as EPA agrees that the
alternative plan is consistent with the CAA and
will attain the standard.26 States that fail to plan
adequately are subject to sanctions, including the
potential loss of federal highway funding.27 EPA
must also establish a federal implementation plan
(FIP), in such cases.28 Once an SIP has been approved, states
are responsible for implementing it. States have their full
arsenal of regulatory powers in implementing their plans—
they have both significant power and significant flexibility.
This flexibility is not unlimited, however. For example, in
nonattainment areas, states are required to impose reasonably available control technology (RACT) on emitters.29
The process of NAAQS regulation is detailed in Chart 2.
Despite the apparent rigidity of the NAAQS regulatory process, EPA succeeded in implementing an emissions
trading system through NAAQS in the late 1990s. Continued failure to reach attainment for the ozone NAAQS
in the 1990s led EPA to require a large group of states to
resubmit SIPs that would address problems arising from
the transport of NOx emissions between states. In the call
for revised SIPs (known as the NOx SIP call), EPA offered a
model rule that the states could adopt and thereby opt into
an interstate emissions trading system.30 All of the affected
states adopted the model rule, and the result is the NOx
Budget Program, a trading system that has widely been
viewed as both effective at reducing emissions and efficient
at doing so at low cost.31 It provides a precedent for the ability of EPA and regulating states to create a trading program
23. 40 C.F.R. §§50.2-50.16 (Westlaw 2010); see also U.S. EPA Air and Radiation, National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), http://www.epa.
gov/air/criteria.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2010) (listing NAAQS for the six
criteria pollutants—carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, particulate
mattter (PM10), PM2.5, ozone, and sulfur dioxide).
24. CAA §110(a), (k).
25. CAA §172(a)(2)(A).
26. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking
for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for
Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone (the NOx SIP Call), 63
Fed. Reg. 57356, 57456-76.
27. CAA §179.
28. CAA §110(c).
29. CAA §172(c)(1).
30. See generally NOx SIP Call, supra note 26.
31. Dallas Burtraw & Sarah Jo Szambelan, U.S. Emissions Trading Markets for
SO2 and NOx, Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 09-40 (2009).
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under the NAAQS program.32 However, EPA’s subsequent
2005 Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR)33 —modeled in
some respects on the NOx SIP call—was remanded to EPA
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
(D.C.) Circuit in 2008. The court raised significant questions with respect to elements of emissions trading under
NAAQS.34

2.

Limitations of NAAQS for GHGs

Despite the instrumental role of the NAAQS program
in CAA regulation, implementing a NAAQS for GHGs
may pose significant difficulties. Some of these problems
are conceptual—the NAAQS framework does not fit the
problem of GHG emissions nearly as well as it does traditional pollutants. Other problems are practical—it may
be difficult to impose effective regulation through the
NAAQS program.
Conceptually, problems arise from the global character
of the GHG/climate change problem. For traditional pollutants, concentrations are greater near (or downwind of)
emitters—pollution is primarily a local or regional problem. In such cases, setting a national air quality standard
and allowing state governments to regulate makes sense.
32. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 908, 38
ELR 20172 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) remanding the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) draws into question at least some elements of emissions
trading schemes under NAAQS.
33. See generally Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter
and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule), 70 Fed. Reg. 25162 (Dec. 29, 2005)
(creating new interstate trading programs under NAAQS and modifying
existing programs)
34. See generally id. (holding, among other concerns, that the CAIR rule failed to
guarantee that under the trading program, emissions from one state would
not “contribute significantly” to nonattainment of NAAQS in downwind
states). It is possible that a GHG trading program would not have similar
problems, since it would not need to be based on states’ contributions to
nonattainment (or interference with maintenance) elsewhere—since GHGs
are globally mixed in the atmosphere, any local GHG emissions affect local
concentrations as much as they affect concentrations elsewhere.

Copyright © 2011 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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Those states with significant emitters and/or high levels of
pollution can and must impose stricter regulations. Emissions that are transported across state borders make this
somewhat more difficult (notably for SO2, NOx, PM, and
ozone). This difficulty has inspired EPA to attempt to create interstate trading programs including the NOx Budget
Program and the more recent CAIR, the latter of which has
come under significant legal challenge, as discussed above.
GHGs are different, however. For the most part, atmospheric concentrations are uniform globally and not related
to local emissions. This creates problems at two points in
the NAAQS process. First, it is not clear at what level a
NAAQS for GHGs should be set. This determination must
be scientific rather than policy-driven, and may prove difficult. Second, because concentrations of GHGs are uniform
nationally, whatever level is chosen by EPA for NAAQS
will result in the entire country either being in attainment
or nonattainment. If the entire country is in attainment,
relatively little regulation can be imposed. If the entire
country is in nonattainment, what are individual states
supposed to plan to do in their SIPs to address their failure
to meet NAAQS? Nothing any individual state could do
would have any significant effect on local GHG concentrations. In short, the cooperative federalism approach that
has been successful in regulating other NAAQS pollutants
seems unsuitable for GHGs.
NAAQS is also a slow process. Although there is no
guarantee that other CAA programs or even programs
implemented in new climate legislation would operate quickly, the NAAQS process is particularly tortuous.
Multiple levels of government are involved, with considerable back-and-forth between them. The CAA itself
imposes a rigid structure on the process, with a requirement for public comment and an opportunity for litigation
at many stages. The process of listing a pollutant, setting
a NAAQS, requesting SIPs, approving them, implementing regulation, and verifying attainment takes many years.
Legal challenges, disputes between states and EPA, and
bureaucratic foot-dragging can slow this process down
substantially. While EPA does have substantial discretion
over the timing of many steps in the process, it (and the
states) must complete all of these steps. Neither the Agency
nor the states have moved quickly or nimbly in regulating
other pollutants under the NAAQS program.
GHG regulation under the NAAQS program could
also present political problems for EPA. The NAAQS program is considered by many to be an expansive, complex,
and relatively intrusive regulatory program. Regulation
of GHGs via the NAAQS program would necessarily be
economywide (encompassing all stationary sources) and
nationwide. Such regulation is likely to be controversial,
and more likely to spur congressional action, although it
is plausible that Congress might react by passing comprehensive climate legislation that would supersede NAAQS.
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that very little support
exists for the regulation of GHGs via the NAAQS program
within EPA or most parts of the policy community. The

41 ELR 10103

climate bills proposed in both the House (Waxman-Markey) and Senate (Kerry-Boxer) would explicitly take away
EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs through the NAAQS
program. Most environmental groups oppose a GHG
NAAQS as well, favoring new legislation and/or regulation through other CAA programs—though one organization has petitioned EPA, claiming that the Agency must
issue a NAAQS.35 In the proposed tailoring rule, EPA
noted that there is no NAAQS for carbon dioxide (CO2;
or the other primary GHGs) and that it does not plan to
promulgate one.36

3.

International Emissions Regulation—An
Alternative Path?

NAAQS is the only CAA regulatory program based on
air quality standards currently in place. No other major,
detailed program exists, but a short (two-paragraph) section of the CAA—one never used by EPA—may provide
an alternative basis for regulation based on air quality
standards.37 This section (CAA §115) is directed at international emissions—that is, U.S. emissions that cause environmental problems elsewhere. Superficially, this seems
ideal for the GHG problem. The section is extremely short
and lacks detail, however. This could be a virtue, in that
it leaves significant discretion to EPA to devise regulation,
but it also exposes such regulation to greater legal scrutiny.
International emissions regulation under §115 has only
two requirements: first, EPA must determine that emissions
originating in the United States endanger public health or
welfare in another country.38 This determination can be
based on reports from an international agency or certification by the Secretary of State.39 For GHGs, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report is
probably sufficient to meet this requirement. Second, the
country affected by U.S. emissions must give the United
States reciprocal rights—that is, the country must control
its emissions that endanger public health or welfare in the
United States.40
Once these requirements have been met, EPA can
require states to revise their SIPs (which all states have
as a result of the regulation of other pollutants through
the NAAQS program) so as to “prevent or eliminate the
endangerment” from GHGs.41 No further guidance as to
what kind of regulation is permitted is given in the stat-

35. See Center for Biological Diversity and 350.org, Petition to Establish National Pollution Limits for Greenhouse Gases Pursuant to the Clean Air
Act (Dec. 2, 2009), at 15, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/
climate_law_institute/global_warming_litigation/clean_air_act/pdfs/Petition_GHG_pollution_cap_12-2-2009.pdf.
36. See U.S. EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55292, 55297 (2009) (hereinafter
tailoring rule).
37. CAA §115.
38. CAA §115(a).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. CAA §115(b).
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guage to justify sweeping regulatory changes.
As Justice Antonin Scalia has put it: “Congress
does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes.”45 Such
broad regulation of GHG emissions under §115
(indeed, any GHG regulation) is highly likely to
be challenged in the courts. The same brevity in
the section that grants EPA the desired regulatory flexibility is likely to be a fatal weak point
in such a challenge. Section 115 may appear to
provide a perfect foundation for GHG regulation, but EPA would risk putting great effort
into developing a regulatory program only to
discover that its foundation is built on sand.

B.

ute. The §115 international emissions regulatory process is
detailed in Chart 3.42
Some analysts, including a former General Counsel of
EPA, have argued that this flexibility makes regulation of
GHG emissions under §115 extremely attractive.43 EPA
would not need to set a single national air quality standard for GHGs and might therefore be able to require
states in their SIPs to make different levels of reductions in
GHG emissions.44 Because the emissions reductions would
be determined by how much is necessary to reduce the
dangers of GHGs internationally, most, if not all, of the
conceptual problems presented by traditional NAAQS
regulation are not present. EPA furthermore might be able
to create an emissions trading system through requested
changes in states’ SIPs, much as it did for NOx in the SIP
call, again without the other restrictions of the NAAQS
process. In short, §115 may allow EPA to tie emissions
reductions to global, rather than local, risks and give it
nearly unlimited flexibility to design an efficient and
effective regulatory program.
The problem with such sweeping regulation under §115
is that it may not be legal. Courts usually take a dim view
of attempts by agencies to use short, vague statutory lan42. Some, including EPA itself, have also proposed regulating GHGs under
§615 of the CAA part of Title VI governing stratospheric ozone protection.
See ANPR, supra note 2, at 44516 (2008). This section, like §115, is short
and appears to give EPA broad authority and discretion—in this case to
regulate anything that “may reasonably be anticipated to affect the stratosphere.” This language in principle provides authority to regulate GHGs
because all of them eventually make their way to the stratosphere. Attempting to create a broad regulatory program based on such sparse language
is relatively unlikely to survive legal challenge, for the same reasons as for
regulation under §115. The section may have some promise for the regulation of GHGs that also have effects on stratospheric ozone, however.
43. See Roger Martella & Matthew Paulson, Regulation of Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, Daily Env’t Rep., Mar. 9, 2009,
at 5, http://www.sidley.com/files/Publication/c789bb2a-7562-4149-8474036f21dee348/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3a6fe43a-22d1-47159f69-04c17efdbd00/GreenhouseGases.pdf.
44. See generally Hannah Chang, Cap and Trade Under the Clean Air Act?: Rethinking Section 115, 40 ELR 10894 (Sept. 2010).

Technology Standards

Although air quality standards (NAAQS)
receive significant attention, technology standards are an equally important part of regulation under the CAA. Furthermore, some of
these programs may present a more favorable
path for the regulation of GHGs.

1.

NSPS

Under §111 of the CAA, EPA has the authority to set
technology-based standards for new stationary sources and
existing sources that make major modifications. EPA also
has the authority to set guidelines for states to use in setting
technology standards for existing sources. The program
created by this section is called the NSPS, even though this
section also provides (in some circumstances) authority for
the regulation of existing sources.
While air quality standards operate on pollutants, the
NSPS under the CAA operate on classes of emitters. These
classes are termed source categories. EPA has significant
discretion to specify these categories. Setting source categories requires EPA to make an endangerment finding—the
Agency must determine that emissions from the source category endanger public health or welfare. This is analogous
to other endangerment findings, in that it is both a threshold requirement and a trigger for mandatory regulation.
Unlike the NAAQS endangerment finding, however, EPA
must find endangerment under the NSPS for each source
category (each type of emitter), not for each pollutant.
EPA has already made an endangerment finding based
on other pollutants and has listed more than 60 source categories and subcategories that cover all major types of stationary sources, including coal, oil, and gas power plants;
refineries; cement plants; and many other industrial facilities. Therefore, no new endangerment finding would be
necessary to regulate GHGs through the NSPS program

45. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 468, 31 ELR 20512 (2001)
(emphasis added).
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for these sources. EPA can also list additional source categories after making an endangerment finding.46
Once a source category has been identified and an
endangerment finding made, EPA must issue performance
standards for new and modified sources within that category. These standards must “reflect[ ] the degree of emission
limitation achievable through the application of the best
system of emissions reduction”47 that has been “adequately
demonstrated.” EPA is permitted to consider costs when
setting the standards. The NSPS do not require emitters to
install a particular technology—they only require emitters
to meet an emissions standard that EPA determines based
on technological options. In practice, emitters may or may
not have much choice over what emissions control measures to take, and they assume some risk if they choose
a measure that differs from predetermined options. As
a result, the NSPS may force the widespread adoption
of specific technology used by only a few plants in the
industry (or in a closely related industry). EPA also
periodically reviews the NSPS—at which time it may
determine that technological progress justifies a stricter
standard. In this sense, the NSPS are moving targets.
(NAAQS can change as well, usually in response to new
scientific information about risks from pollutants.)
Once the NSPS for a source category have been set,
they apply to all new sources in the category and any
sources that undergo a “major modification.” What
modifications qualify as “major” is a topic of significant contention, and sometimes litigation, between
the Agency and emitters; EPA has, as a result, issued
detailed regulatory guidelines for this determination.
Emitters must show compliance with the NSPS before
construction can proceed.
The NSPS program, as described to this point, applies
only to new and modified sources and is primarily federal (EPA can delegate enforcement authority to states).
Under some conditions, existing sources are also regulated under the NSPS program under §111(d) of the CAA.
Unlike the primarily federal NSPS for new and modified
sources, §111(d) regulation delegates planning and enforcement to the states in a manner similar to that described
above for NAAQS regulation. However, this authority to regulate existing sources with performance standards is only available for pollutants not regulated under
the NAAQS program or as toxic pollutants under §112
(discussed in Subsection III.B.2. below). If a pollutant is
regulated under either of these programs, no performance
standards can be implemented under the NSPS for existing
sources. This may be a barrier to integrated approaches that
might otherwise combine the regulation of GHGs under
the NSPS and the NAAQS programs (or under §112) for
existing sources.

46. In fact, EPA is probably legally required to include GHG emissions standards in future revisions of NSPS for existing-source categories. See infra
notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
47. CAA §111(a)(1).

41 ELR 10105

Assuming that a pollutant is not regulated under these
other programs, §111(d) of the CAA provides that EPA
must create a system under which states will create performance standards for existing sources and submit plans
to implement the standards (similar to SIPs under the
NAAQS program). The Agency has the responsibility and
the authority to approve or disapprove these plans, and
implement a federal plan if states fail to adequately set standards. Subject to EPA approval of their plans, states have
significant flexibility to set standards for existing sources.
For example, they are explicitly authorized to take into
account how much useful life remains for a source.48 The
NSPS regulatory process is detailed in Chart 4.

The current precedent for emissions trading under the
NSPS program is limited. In principle, EPA could implement trading within a source category by claiming that
trading itself was the “best system of emission reduction.”
Whether this is a permissible reading of the statute has not
been determined by courts. Evidence suggests that it may
be permissible, however. First, any challenge would have
to overcome the substantial deference shown to agency
readings of their own statutes under Chevron v. NRDC.49
Second, EPA issued a regulation establishing a trading
program for mercury emissions from electricity-generating
units in 2005, purporting to use CAA §111(d) authority.50
Although the D.C. Circuit rejected EPA’s mercury rule,
it did so on other grounds—the court gave no indication
that emissions trading under the NSPS program was itself
48. CAA §111(d)(1)(B).
49. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984), the Supreme Court held that agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language prevail unless they are not “reasonable” or “permissible.”
50. See generally U.S. EPA, Clean Air Mercury Rule, Basic Information, http://
www.epa.gov/mercuryrule/basic.htm (stating that the rule was “issued under . . . section[ ] . . . 111 of the law”).
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problematic (though it is of course possible that the court
simply did not reach the issue).51 A small trading program
also exists for NOx emissions for one source category of
emitters, solid waste combustors, though EPA’s authority
for this program is only derived partially from §111.52
Further, EPA is arguably required to issue GHG
NSPS. Because Massachusetts determined that GHGs
are pollutants, and the mobile-source rules have further
made them pollutants regulated under the CAA, any
new NSPS probably must include performance standards
for GHGs. EPA, environmental groups, and some states
have disagreed in the past about whether GHGs must
be included in NSPS revisions. In the first such revision after Massachusetts was decided, for the petroleum
refinery source category, EPA received comments claiming that it was required to include GHG regulations in
the new NSPS.53 The Agency responded that it was not
required, and in any event lacked enough time to do so
(the revised NSPS were finalized four weeks after the
decision in Massachusetts).54 Many of EPA’s arguments in
declining to include GHGs, such as lack of time and the
fact that, at the time, GHGs were not regulated under
the CAA, are no longer valid—though EPA’s broad
claim that it has general discretion in deciding whether
NSPS will be set for a given pollutant remains. The
political and legal situations have changed, however,
and EPA is much more inclined to regulate GHGs with
CAA tools than it was under the Bush Administration
in 2008. EPA may believe that, having issued a positive GHG endangerment finding and regulated GHGs
under the CAA, it must now include GHGs in future
NSPS revisions.55
Recent EPA actions appear to reflect such a shift
in agency position. A group of states challenged EPA’s
reliance on this discretion in 2008,56 and in late 2010,
EPA announced that it had settled with the states and
agreed to implement GHG controls via new (§111(b))
and existing-source (§111(d)) NSPS on at least some
51. See generally New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 38 ELR 20046 (D.C. Cir.
2008). EPA, state plaintiffs challenging the CAMR rule, and environmental-group intervenors each briefed the issue of trading under §111(d) in
varying degrees of detail. Unsuprisingly, EPA concluded that it was legal,
while plaintiffs and intervenors claimed it was not. Our sense is that the
Agency has the better of this argument, but the fact that it is untested in
court does present real legal risk for a §111(d) trading program. This risk is
discussed further in Section IV.C. below.
52. See 40 C.F.R. §60.33b(2) (stating: “A State plan may establish a program to
allow owners or operators of municipal waste combustor plants to engage
in trading of nitrogen oxides emission credits. A trading program must be
approved by EPA before implementation.”).
53. See Standards of Performance for Petroleum Refineries; Final Rule, 73 Fed.
Reg. 35838, 35838 (June 24, 2008).
54. Id. at 35838-60.
55. Roger Martella, former U.S. EPA General Counsel, has stated that EPA will
likely take the position that, after the December 2009 endangerment finding, it must include GHGs in future NSPS revisions. See Robin Bravender,
EPA Notice Sets Stage for Regulation Writing, Lawsuits, Greenwire, Dec 15,
2009, available at http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2009/12/15/3.
56. See New York Office of the Attorney General, Press Release, Cuomo Files
Lawsuit to Force Bush EPA to Control Global Warming Pollution From Big
Oil Refineries, Aug. 25, 2008, available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2008/aug/aug25b_08.html.
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source categories.57 According to the settlement agreement, proposed rulemakings will be announced in
mid-2011.58
The NSPS program is the most plausible and practical
candidate for regulation of GHGs from stationary sources,
chiefly because it lacks the conceptual and practical problems presented by NAAQS and the legal difficulties presented by §115 on international emissions. In Sections IV
and V of this Article, we present a possible pathway to such
regulation under the NSPS program and discuss its advantages and disadvantages in more detail.

2.

Hazardous/Toxic Air Pollutant Regulation

Section 112 of the CAA creates a separate technologyfocused program for the regulation of certain toxic or hazardous emissions.59 This hazardous air pollutant (HAP)
program is an important component of the CAA and
covers a vast range of pollutants that present significant
health risks. The program gives EPA broad authority to
directly regulate toxic substances—states do not play a
significant role.
Although an understanding of toxic emissions regulation under §112 is important to understanding the CAA as
a whole, it is not likely to be a useful vehicle for the regulation of most GHGs. The program is designed for highly
toxic substances emitted in relatively low quantities—most
GHGs are not toxic and are emitted in large quantities.
Very stringent “major source” emissions thresholds are
the first problem with regulating GHGs as toxic pollutants.
Section 112 regulations apply to all “major sources” of pollutants listed under the section, with major sources defined
as those emitting 10 tons per year or more of any single
toxic pollutant or 25 or more tons per year of any combination of listed toxic pollutants.60 Regulation of CO2 under a
program with such low emissions triggers is impractical to
the point of absurdity, because it would affect tens of millions of small sources.
Statutory requirements for very strict regulation present another problem for regulating GHGs as toxic pollutants. Section 112 requires EPA to set emissions standards
at the “maximum degree of reduction in emissions” that
the Agency determines is achievable.61 For existing sources,
this is defined as the maximum degree of emissions reduction achieved by the best 12% of existing sources.62 In any
case, this level of mandatory reduction does not allow for
the consideration of cost.63 Furthermore, §112 provides no
legal basis for emissions trading.
57. See Settlement Agreement Between State Petitioners, Environmental Petitioners, and EPA, Dec. 10, 2010, at 3, available online at http://www.epa.
gov/airquality/pdfs/boilerghgsettlement.pdf.
58. Id.
59. CAA §112.
60. CAA §112(a)(1).
61. CAA §112(d)(2).
62. CAA §112(d)(3)(A).
63. Id. Note that CAA §112(d)(2) does permit EPA to consider costs when
defining “maximum degree of reduction in emissions” generally, but that
the maximum achievable control technology floors specified in CAA

Copyright © 2011 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

2-2011

NEWS & ANALYSIS

In short, the HAP program is a poor fit for general GHG
regulation under the CAA. It may be a useful option for
some minor GHGs that are toxic, but the HAP program
does not provide the policy flexibility necessary for a costeffective approach to the regulation of major GHGs.

C.

Permitting

The CAA creates programs for permitting new and modified stationary sources that operate in parallel to the air
quality standards (NAAQS) and technology standards
(NSPS and HAP). The two main permitting programs
include one for major new or modified sources and one for
major existing sources. In other words, the CAA creates
a requirement for both construction and operating permits. The construction permitting program is termed new
source review (NSR).64 The operating permit program is
referred to by the part of the CAA that created it: Title V.65
Permitting under the CAA is very complex. What follows
is only a very broad overview.
The Title V operating permitting program, at least in
theory, does not impose new requirements on the stationary sources that are required to obtain permits—it provides
an enforcement tool rather than separate regulation. Title
V permits are broad in that they are intended to specify all
applicable CAA requirements for the plant.66 Despite not
imposing new requirements, the permitting process can be
complex. Permits may take more than a year to obtain, the
cost for the process can be high, and administrative costs
are shifted entirely onto emitters.
The NSR program for construction permits, on the
other hand, does impose new requirements. Permitting
under NSR requires both site-specific, technology-based
review of the control technology proposed by the source
and a demonstration that the plant will not create or exacerbate violations of air quality standards in the area surrounding the plant.67 NSR requirements differ depending
on whether the area in which the plant is located is classified as an attainment area or a nonattainment area under
the NAAQS program. The control technology review will
result in direct, substantive regulatory requirements. The
NSR technology-based review often results in more stringent standards than those required by the NSPS program.
In the case of GHGs, plants subject to NSR will be subject to control requirements independent of EPA decisions
on whether and how to implement a GHG control strategy
for stationary sources under other applicable provisions
of the CAA. EPA’s position is that as soon as any restrictions placed on emissions of a pollutant under any CAA
authority become effective, sources that emit that pollut-

64.

65.
66.
67.

§112(d)(3) are explicitly defined based on emissions from existing sources,
irrespective of cost.
CAA §160-169, §173. NSR is sometimes also referred to as PSD, for prevention of significant deterioration—though this term technically applies
only to areas in attainment with respect to a pollutant regulated under
NAAQS.
CAA §501-506.
CAA §502(f ).
CAA §165.
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ant are subject to permitting—even if the regulation does
not apply to them directly.68 For GHGs, this means that
mobile-source regulation will trigger NSR and Title V permitting for covered stationary sources.
The inclusion of GHGs in the NSR process will result
in significant additional regulation for large GHG emitters (with the determination of which sources are sufficiently large a significant issue, as discussed below). Even
though such emitters are already subject to NSR review for
new construction (because they also emit other pollutants
regulated under the CAA), that process will now involve
control technology review for GHGs. It is not yet clear
what this control technology requirement will look like,
but EPA (and the states) will make such determinations
on a case-by-case basis. It is also possible that what would
in the past have been considered trivial modifications or
“routine maintenance” to existing plants, insufficient to
trigger modified-source NSR, would now be considered
major modifications because of their impact on GHG
emissions. This would result in much more frequent NSR
for these sources.
Another problem arises, however, from the CAA definition of what a “major” source is (recall that only major
sources need NSR or Title V permits). The threshold
beyond which sources are classed as major is defined in the
CAA at 100 tons of annual emissions (250 tons in some
cases).69 If a source emits more than this threshold of any
pollutant regulated under the CAA, it is a major source
and must obtain a permit. This threshold was set with traditionally regulated pollutants in mind—SO2, PM, NOx,
and so forth. It presents a significant problem if GHGs are
regulated because GHG emissions, particularly CO2, are
emitted in much larger volumes. Fossil-fuel power plants
and some industrial facilities emit tens of thousands of
tons of CO2 annually. A threshold of 100 (or 250) tons
would include not only these large facilities, but also many
smaller facilities that are not currently subject to CAA regulation. Large office and apartment buildings, hospitals,
commercial facilities, and other emitters could exceed this
threshold. This is a significant problem both for regulators
and emitters. Regulators, often states under authority del68. See PSD Interpretive Memo From Stephen L. Johnson, EPA Administrator,
to EPA Regional Administrators (Dec. 18, 2008), at 6, http://www.epa.gov/
NSR/documents/psd_interpretive_memo_12.18.08.pdf (stating that EPA
interpretation of language in the CAA and its own regulations requiring
NSR for facilities emitting pollutants “subject to regulation” under the CAA
means that NSR applies to “each pollutant subject to either a provision in
the Clean Air Act or regulation promulgated by EPA under the Clean Air
Act that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant”). EPA further
has interpreted this requirement to mean that NSR is required once regulations of a pollutant actually become effective. In the case of GHGs, this will
be January 2, 2011. See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations
That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs,
75 Fed. Reg. 17004, 17004 (2010).
69. CAA §169(1). Note that this is the threshold requirement for inclusion
in the PSD/NSR permitting program. For existing sources undergoing
modification, however, the EPA retains some discretion in defining the
relevant threshold. The statute includes no threshold for modifications,
but the agency and courts have accepted a de minimis exception. It is
unclear what level of GHG emissions would qualify as de minimis absent
an agency determination.
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egated by EPA, are not administratively prepared to deal
with such a volume of permit requests. Small emitters are
unlikely to have good information about permit requirements and would face significant costs in time and money.
EPA is attempting to address this looming problem by
restricting permit requirements, at least initially, to sources
emitting more than 75,000 tons of GHGs in its “tailoring rule.”70 Such tailoring directly contradicts the statutory language in the CAA, however, and its survival in a
court challenge is therefore questionable. EPA has claimed
“administrative necessity” and “absurd results” legal
defenses against such a challenge, but these doctrines are
rarely applied and are best considered a legal last resort. If
the tailoring rule fails, however, Congress would probably
act to avoid the consequences for small emitters discussed
above. Big changes to the CAA would not be necessary—a
simple change in the threshold for permitting to a higher
level for GHGs would be sufficient. This would not address
the burden of more frequent NSR for major sources, however. NSR would, therefore, operate as an independent and
continuing regulatory requirement on large GHG sources,
even in the absence of GHG regulation with air quality or
technology standards (NAAQS or NSPS). The NSR permitting process under the CAA is detailed in Chart 5 (the
Title V process is separate and not shown).

III. The Knowable Path
Among the many pathways toward regulation of existingsource GHG emissions under the CAA presented in the
previous section, we believe it is possible to identify one
that is the most likely and predictable, i.e., “knowable,”
pathway, worth describing in more detail. We begin this
70. See U.S. EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule (Final Tailoring Rule). 75 Fed. Reg. 31514, 31516
(2010).
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section with a discussion of the near-future timeline for
EPA regulation of GHGs and proceed by discussing how
that knowable pathway—NSPS regulation—fits into that
timeline and how it would likely develop.

A.

Stationary-Source GHG Regulatory Timeline

With so many regulatory programs under the CAA potentially affecting different classes of stationary sources, it is
useful to consider the timeline along which regulation is
likely to unfold. Chart 1 above provides a general overview of this process and the order in which steps are likely
to be taken. Mobile-source regulation was implemented
in March 2010. Now that final mobile-source regulations
have been issued, GHGs will become a regulated pollutant under the CAA (once these regulations become
effective in January 2011), triggering the NSR and Title
V permitting processes.71 In a related action in March
2010, EPA determined that the NSR permit program
would be triggered when the mobile-source rule becomes
effective.72 Any new stationary sources or existing sources
undergoing major modifications after this date would be
subject to NSR review. At least initially, the tailoring
rule would restrict permit requirements to large emitters.
Whether this remains the case in the long term hinges
on the result of a legal challenge to that rule.
That challenge is likely to begin shortly after
the NSR process itself, but may not be resolved
for months or years.
Proceeding separately, NSPS regulation is
likely to be the next event to unfold. Under
§111, EPA is required to regularly update the
NSPS for listed source categories of emissions
of pollutants regulated under the Act.73 As these
NSPS revisions proceed, EPA will likely include
performance standards for GHGs; indeed the
Agency’s December 2010 settlement commits
the Agency to this pathway for at least some
source categories. New NSPS are scheduled to
be issued for several significant categories of
GHG emitters over the next two years; the first
will be an NSPS for electric utility-generating
units, followed by NSPS for oil and gas refineries.74 The Administration’s 2011 budget request
to Congress includes a request for support of
71. See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations, supra note 68, at
17004. The PSD program primarily applies to criteria pollutants covered
by NAAQS. However, some of the substantive NSR requirements of the
PSD program—notably the best available control technology (BACT) provisions—also apply to regulated pollutants for which there are no NAAQS
(and no other statutory exemptions under §§112 and 211(o) from PSD).
See ANPR, supra note 2, at 44497.
72. See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations, supra note 68, at
17004. See also Letter from Lisa Jackson, EPA Administrator, to Sen. Jay D.
Rockefeller IV (Feb. 22, 2010), at 3, available at http://epa.gov/oar/pdfs/
LPJ_letter.pdf.
73. CAA §111(b)(1)(B).
74. See U.S. EPA, Regulatory Plan and Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, Fall
2009, at 7 (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/documents/
regagendabook-fall09.pdf.
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NSPS standard-setting for GHGs, which provides a further signal that the NSPS pathway is an option under serious consideration by the Agency.75
By early 2011, therefore, the general character of GHG
regulation under the CAA should be clear—mobile-source
regulation will be in place, the GHG NSR permitting
under the tailoring rule will be underway (though related
litigation will be a possible source of uncertainty), and
NSPS for some source categories may begin to reveal EPA’s
approach to technology standards for GHGs.
The NSPS pathway probably has the broadest support
among the various parts of the policy community. As noted
above, little support exists for regulation of GHGs via the
NAAQS program within or outside of EPA. In addition,
a robust NSPS program regulating both new and existing sources may provide a way to avoid the problems and
disadvantages that attend the NAAQS process. A GHG
NAAQS is still a long-term possibility. Even if it is relatively
unpopular now, litigation over whether a GHG NAAQS
is required will likely continue. Even if EPA eventually
decides to or is forced to implement a GHG NAAQS, that
regulatory process will take years. Consequently, we focus
on NSPS regulation as the most likely, and most readily
knowable, path for regulation under the CAA.76

B.

The Traditional NSPS Regulation Framework

NSPS regulation (under §111) offers the potential for a
comprehensive program of regulation for new and existing
major stationary sources of GHGs. Traditionally, NSPS
have been set as technology-based standards for new or
modified sources. EPA has significant discretion to identify
the type of facility covered by NSPS regulations in terms
of setting size thresholds and in determining the types of
equipment covered. Under this approach, EPA defines categories or subcategories of covered sources based on specific characteristics of the industrial process—for example,
EPA has established standards for catalytic cracking units
at petroleum refineries and for coal-fired boilers. EPA then
identifies control technologies that can be applied to the
source category or subcategory. After consideration of a
variety of factors (including the cost and effectiveness of
control), EPA typically establishes a performance standard,
e.g., pounds of SO2 per million British thermal units (Btu),
that the selected control technology can meet.77
Under §111(d), as noted above, EPA sets guidelines for
state regulation of existing sources. These guidelines would
be binding requirements that the states must address in
75. See Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2011, at 126 (Feb. 1, 2010) (stating: “The Budget also requests $7 million to develop New Source Performance Standards to control
GHG emissions from a few categories of major stationary sources.”), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/environmental.pdf.
76. Recall, however, that if the NAAQS process, or regulation under §112 for
that matter, were to come to fruition, it would block any regulation of existing sources under NSPS. In other words, NSPS regulation of existing sources requires that these sources not be regulated in these other CAA programs.
77. EPA also has the authority to set work practice standards under specific
conditions.
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their state plans. As with the NAAQS planning process,
state plans under §111(d) are subject to EPA approval, and
if a state fails to adopt a state plan, then EPA must issue an
FIP for that state.78 In the past, EPA has issued model plans
for adoption by the states. These guidelines should follow
the same basic standard-setting elements used in setting
NSPS for new and modified sources. Section 111(d) and
EPA regulations recognize, however, that different, less
stringent requirements may be appropriate for existing
sources. As discussed in Section III.B.1. above, EPA has
interpreted §111(d) as allowing the adoption of an emissions trading program for NO x emissions from municipal
waste combustors and for mercury emissions from coalfired electric utility units.79 Hence, there is a precedent
under the NSPS program for implementing a trading
program for GHGs that would affect both new and existing sources.

C.

Advantages and Disadvantages of NSPS
Regulation of GHGs

Beyond the fact that they are the most likely next step in
CAA GHG regulation, NSPS for GHGs offer identifiable
advantages relative to regulation of GHGs under other
CAA provisions—as well as their share of disadvantages.

1.

Advantages of NSPS for GHGs:
• NSPS regulation is an established program.
EPA has significant experience in regulation under
the NSPS program. NSPS currently regulate many
emitting sectors of the U.S. economy and cover a
large number of pollutants. Although §111(d) regulation of existing stationary sources is more limited
because it does not include those pollutants regulated under the NAAQS program or §112, it also is a
well-established regulatory mechanism. This experience and precedent reduces the risk of litigation, and
the program is familiar to emitters, environmental
groups, and other stakeholders. Even for untested
elements of the regulatory approach discussed here
(notably, emissions trading options under the NSPS
program), there is significant value to building on
the foundation of an established regulatory program
such as the NSPS, rather than creating a program
out of whole cloth as would have to be done with,
for example, GHG regulation under §115 (see Section III.A.3.). As discussed in Section IV.A. above,
EPA will also likely include GHGs in future NSPS
for existing source categories.
• The NSPS process may be relatively fast.

78. CAA §111(d)(2).
79. As noted above, the Clean Air Mercury Rule for coal-fired power plants was
vacated by the D.C. Circuit in New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 38 ELR
20302 (D.C. Cir. 2008). However, that decision did not reach the question
as to whether EPA has the authority to adopt an emissions trading approach
under §111(d).
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Compared to some other regulatory programs under
the CAA that might be used for GHGs, the NSPS
may proceed relatively quickly. The NAAQS process
requires a great deal of time, as discussed in Section
III.A.2. above.
• The NSPS regulation provides a flexible, cost-effective approach.
NSPS regulation has traditionally applied to individual sectors, as defined by EPA through its regulation
by source category. This sectoral focus provides EPA
with flexibility in terms of selecting source categories for regulation, redefining source categories, and
identifying size thresholds for regulation. This allows
EPA to focus on source categories for which regulation is more straightforward or those that present the
greatest opportunities for emissions reduction (such
as coal-fired power plants).
• NSPS regulation of existing sources operates through
the states.
As discussed above, under §111(d) regulation, EPA
sets guidelines for states to issue performance standards for existing sources, with the Agency retaining
approval authority over those policies. This system
distributes administrative burdens and allows states
to tailor regulation to local conditions. States also
have powers that EPA, due to statutory or constitutional limitations, does not. States, for example,
would probably have the power to auction emissions
allowances or impose fees.
• Emissions trading under the NSPS program is
legally plausible.
As discussed in Section III.B.1. above, emissions
trading under the NSPS program is legally plausible,
though it has limited precedent. EPA has already
asserted that it has the authority under §111 to adopt
an emissions trading approach for new and existing
sources in the Clean Air Mercury Rule.80 Such an
approach provides an incentive for sources to identify and make low-cost emissions reductions beyond
those required to meet a technology-based standard,
ensuring a cost-effective regulatory approach. EPA
also believes that a trading approach could allow it to
consider larger reductions in GHG emissions than it
would otherwise be able to require under technologybased standards and to adopt a phased approach with
more stringent emissions limits in the later phase(s).81
• EPA may consider costs under NSPS regulation.
Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
CAA, EPA is forbidden to consider costs under

80. See U.S. EPA, Clean Air Mercury Rule, Basic Information, http://www.epa.
gov/mercuryrule/basic.htm (stating: “The Clean Air Mercury Rule established a cap-and-trade system for mercury that is based on EPA’s proven
Acid Rain Program.”).
81. ANPR, supra note 2, at 44490.
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the NAAQS program.82 This is not the case under
§111(d) NSPS regulation—the CAA explicitly allows
the Agency to consider costs when setting NSPS.83
Consideration of costs should lead to a more efficient
regulatory program, especially because regulations
address sectors independently of each other.

2.

Disadvantages of NSPS for GHGs:
• NSPS and NAAQS regulation are mutually exclusive.
As discussed above, §111(d) allows regulation of existing sources only for pollutants that have not been
listed under §108 (the first step of the NAAQS process). If a NAAQS has been established for a pollutant, no §111(d) regulation is possible, and if §111(d)
regulation is in place and a NAAQS is subsequently
issued, that §111(d) regulation is effectively cancelled.
EPA has no apparent plans to issue a GHG NAAQS,
but it is possible that it will be forced to do so by
litigation.84 If this were to happen, any §111 program
in place would no longer cover existing sources. EPA
might understandably be concerned about wasting
its limited resources on creating a program that could
be killed, not by direct legal challenge, but by such an
indirect attack.
• Emissions trading under the NSPS program carries
some legal risk.
As discussed above, emissions trading schemes under
the NSPS program have limited legal precedent.
Whether the “best system of emission reduction”
definition of “standard of performance” can be interpreted to include emissions trading is an untested
legal question. EPA is probably entitled to Chevron
deference on this point, but challenge is likely and
victory is not certain. If NSPS emissions trading were
ruled to be incompatible with the CAA, the Agency’s
regulatory options would be limited to traditional,
technology-driven performance standards with a corresponding increase in sectorwide compliance costs.
• NSPS regulation is traditionally highly technical.
Past NSPS regulations have required technical, dataintensive analysis of regulated source categories to
identify the technology behind the “best system
of emissions reduction.” Such analysis is time-consuming and places high demands on EPA resources.
These demands would undoubtedly increase if NSPS
analyses had to include GHGs as well.

In addition to these disadvantages in comparison to other
CAA regulatory programs, all CAA programs are likely to
82. See generally Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 31 ELR 20152
(2001).
83. CAA §111(a)(1).
84. One of us has written elsewhere that such a challenge would be likely to succeed. See Richardson, supra note 13. We assume for purposes of this Article
that such a challenge would not affect NSPS regulation, either because it
is rejected by courts or because Congress enacts legislation granting EPA
discretion not to issue a NAAQS for GHGs.
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be inferior to regulation under new, climate-specific legislation. Because §111 standards are tied to a showing that
they are based on a demonstrated control technology, the
emissions reductions achievable under §111 requirements
may be limited to feasible and cost-effective reductions.
EPA may not be able to require GHG reductions that are
as stringent as those that would be mandated by current
proposed legislation. In addition, because these standards
are established for source categories that have traditionally been narrowly defined, it may be difficult to expand
the regulatory scope enough to encourage fuel-switching
(and it is probably impossible to include alternative, renewable sources of energy within the scope of the regulation,
because such sources emit no pollutants, and are therefore
outside the scope of the CAA). EPA also would be unable
to include international offset mechanisms.85 Regulation
under the NSPS, or for that matter any CAA program,
would not solve any difficulties arising from permitting
requirements.86 Finally, the sectoral approach allows Congress and the regulated entities within the sector to focus
attention and political pressure on emissions regulations to
get a better deal.

3.

IV.

focus on the regulation of existing sources in the electricity
sector because they will constitute the majority of emissions in the sector for decades into the future and because
the design of regulation to affect existing sources is the
most challenging part of regulation under the CAA.88
In general, this Article further assumes that no changes
are made to EPA’s existing NSPS source categories. EPA
generally has broad discretion to make such changes,
although it has rarely done so.89 This assumption has been
made to simplify the analysis, rather than to suggest that
such changes would be problematic.

A.

Analysis of GHG NSPS in the
Electricity Sector

In this section, we explore the potential magnitude of
emissions reductions that might be achieved, and how
they might be achieved, by regulation under the CAA
in one important case study—the electricity sector. We
focus primarily on coal-fired electricity-generation, which
represents 50% of the electricity-generation and accounts
for 33% of CO2-equivalent (CO2e) emissions nationally.87
Hence, coal-fired electricity is probably the most important
emissions source for consideration. In addition, extensive,
detailed data for individual plants exists for this sector. We
85. See Nathan Richardson, International Greenhouse Gas Offsets Under the
Clean Air Act, 40 ELR 10887 (Sept. 2010).
86. These potential problems with CAA permitting processes are discussed in
Section III.C. above.
87. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2010
Early Release, DOE/EIA-0383 (2010) (Dec. 14, 2009).

General Options for NSPS Regulation in the
Electricity Sector

In its Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM),
EPA identified several approaches it might take in regulating GHG emissions from existing power plants under its
§111(d) NSPS authority, including the following:90
• work practice and design standards;
• an energy efficiency standard for boilers or power
plants;

Summary

On balance, we feel that the advantages of NSPS regulation
outweigh the disadvantages. The benefits of possible emissions trading and the flexibility of NSPS in general seem
to outweigh the associated legal risks. State involvement
appears to have more positive than negative impacts. It is
not our purpose here, however, to advocate on behalf of the
NSPS as an ideal or even attractive option for GHG regulation under the CAA. Instead, we present these advantages
and disadvantages to support the claim, further buttressed
by anecdotal evidence from EPA and President Obama’s
proposed budget, and most of all from EPA’s recent settlement agreement, that the NSPS program is the likely route
for regulation of existing GHG sources under the CAA.
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• a standard requiring the substitution of biomass
(cofiring) for some types of coal-fired plants; and
• market-based regulatory mechanisms.
We do not address work practice and design standards
as a regulatory approach, but focus on the other approaches
listed above: energy efficiency standards, biomass cofiring
requirements, and market-based regulation.

1.

Energy Efficiency Standards

The efficiency of a power plant can be expressed by its heat
rate, which is the heat input (Btu) required per unit of electricity output (kilowatt hour [kWh]). EPA has suggested
that energy efficiency-based regulation is likely to achieve
only modest improvements in heat rates (and, consequently,
relatively modest reductions in GHG emissions).91 This is
not a surprising conclusion. Electric utilities already face
substantial incentives to improve heat rates to reduce fuel
costs. However, evidence indicates that there is a range of
performance characteristics across coal-fired power plants,
and even within specific boiler technology categories.
For existing coal-fired steam-electric plants, options to
reduce the heat rate include the following: optimizing the
performance of basic plant systems, improving control systems, installing high-efficiency electrical components, e.g.,
motors, and reducing the moisture content of solid fuel.
EPA has reported that a reasonable expectation for individual coal-fired plants would be a 2-5% reduction (rang88. EPA is likely to require new sources to comply with a unit-specific emissions limit.
89. See Mullins & Enion, supra note 3, at 35-38.
90. See ANPR, supra note 2, at 44486-93.
91. Id. at 44488.
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ing up to as much as 10% for a few plants). Although an
assessment of broad applicability and cost would need to
be done, a reasonable expectation for the average fleetwide
heat-rate reduction is in the range of 2-5%.92 A recent draft
National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) report
suggests that even greater improvements, on average, are
possible.93 Because the emissions from coal-fired generation at existing facilities are roughly proportional to fuel
use, an improvement in heat rate leads to a proportional
reduction in emissions.
In its assessment for the ANPR, EPA did not provide an
estimate of the likely improvement in heat rate for existing natural gas-fired electricity-generating plants. Instead,
EPA simply reported that much more limited options are
probably available for significant efficiency improvements
for these plants.94

2.

Biomass Cofiring Requirements

Biomass can be mixed with coal and fired in a conventional
coal-fired boiler up to a limit at which it begins to degrade
boiler performance.95 On average for most types of boilers,
roughly 10% of the heat input at a coal-fired boiler can be
provided through biomass. If one considers biomass to be
roughly CO2 neutral, the substitution of biomass for coal
leads directly to net emissions reductions. Because biomass
supply constraints in some geographic regions limit the
use of cofiring for existing coal-fired boilers, EPA is likely
to find it difficult to establish cofiring requirements on a
plant-by-plant basis. However, EPA has reported that biomass cofiring might replace 2-5% (on a fleetwide basis) of
the coal used by existing coal-fired plants.96

3.

Market-Based Regulation

As discussed above, EPA has interpreted §111(d) as allowing the use of a market-based approach for regulating
emissions from existing sources. These emissions trading systems could include cap-and-trade and rate-based
regulations that allow trading to achieve GHG emissions
reductions. EPA believes that because of the cost savings associated with these approaches, it could consider
deeper reductions through a market-based approach than
92. U.S. EPA, Technical Supporting Document for the ANPRM: Stationary Sources, Section VII, at 16-17.
93. NETL, Improving the Efficiency of Coal-Fired Power Plants for Near Term
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions (Feb. 24, 2010) (draft).
94. U.S. EPA, Technical Supporting Document, supra note 92, at 16.
95. EPA and other studies upon which our analysis is based broadly treat biomass cofiring as carbon-neutral. While our inclusion of biomass in our
analysis represents tacit acceptance of this position, we are aware that the
issue is controversial in both the scientific and policy communities. Necessarily, one’s position on the GHG impact of biomass affects interpretation
of the total emissions reductions we suggest. However, our goal here is
to analyze CAA regulation based on available data. Attempting to resolve
scientific controversies is beyond the scope of this Article and, in any case,
our expertise.
96. U.S. EPA, Technical Supporting Document, supra note 92, at 17. See
also Electric Power Research Institute, Biomass Cofiring Update
2002, 1004319, Final Report (July 2003).
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it could support through a conventional technologybased standard.97
As discussed in Section III.B.1. above, EPA generally
believes that such programs would be consistent with the
NSPS provisions of §111 because they would be structured
to satisfy the definition of “standard of performance.”98
That is, the trading program would establish a standard for
emissions that:
• reflects the degree of emissions limitation achievable;
• constitutes the “best system” of emissions reduction;
and
• has been adequately demonstrated.
With respect to an electricity-sector NSPS specifically,
the Agency would probably argue that the trading program would reflect its judgment on the overall degree of
emissions reduction that could be achieved by the source
category. This program would achieve greater emissions
reductions than could be achieved through the more traditional approach of establishing a generally applicable
technology-based standard that applies to each plant. In
addition, it would provide sources with the flexibility to
determine the best way to meet the program emissions
requirements. The resulting program establishes a “price”
for the control of emissions and provides an incentive for
innovation. As a result, EPA could plausibly argue, a trading approach would constitute the “best system” of emissions reduction.
If EPA adopted a cap-and-trade approach for existing
sources, states would have the responsibility to allocate
allowances. In previous CAA rules that have authorized
a cap-and-trade system, EPA has left the allocation decisions to the states. Thus, states would probably determine
the frequency of allocations, i.e., a one-time allocation
or a periodic allocation every, say, three years, the basic
method of allocation, e.g., a grandfather approach, updating output-based allocation, or an auction, and the use
of set-asides, e.g., set-asides for energy efficiency projects,
renewable energy sources, or for new units.99
If, on the other hand, EPA were to adopt a model trading rule based on a performance standard, then sources
would earn allowances based on their quantity of production at the rate embodied in the performance standard
(tons/megawatt hour (MWh)).100 Sources would surrender
allowances based on their emissions. This approach would
avoid the contentious allocation issues associated with
97. ANPR, supra note 2, at 44490.
98. CAA §111(a)(1).
99. See, e.g., Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and
Ozone (CAIR), 70 Fed. Reg. 25278-82 (May 12, 2005); Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28627 (May 18, 2005).
100. “This type of allocation is labeled “updating” because the award of tradable
allowances is updated based on current or recent performance rather than
“fixed” according to a historic measure. In this case, the allocation is “output
based” because it depends on the production output of electricity. The initial allocation will be based on the characteristics of the fleet of EGUS when
the program begins.” Id.
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cap and trade. But it carries its own disadvantages. The
grandfathered allocation approach implicit in a tradable
performance standard could lead to changes in revenues
through increased product prices that greatly outstrip the
change in costs to comply with the standard, resulting in
so-called windfall profits.101 In addition, a tradable performance standard market may not be as smoothly functioning a market as cap and trade. Compliance with a tradable
performance standard may be less transparent than an
emissions allowance under a cap-and-trade approach, and
trading of offsets may require demonstration that a source
was not going to shut down anyway, giving rise to higher
transaction costs associated with ensuring the quality of
the offset credits. Also, it is not clear whether banking of
offsets would be allowed. In addition, a performance-based
measure would not cap emissions from the regulated sector. With growth in production, a corresponding increase
in energy use and emissions would occur.

B.

Opportunities to Reduce Emissions

The primary way that emissions reductions might be
obtained from the electricity sector is through reducing
emissions from coal, including fuel-switching from coal
to natural gas or non-emitting generation sources. However, as we have noted, under the CAA, EPA might start
with opportunities for efficiency improvements at existing facilities.
Figure 1 displays existing coal-fired plants according
to their heat rate along the horizontal axis.102 The vertical axis is heat input, indicating where most of the generation occurs. As one might expect, the most heavily used
plants are among the most efficient, with heat rates less
than 10,000 Btu per kWh of electricity-generation. However, the figure displays a substantial right-hand tail, with a
number of facilities that appear to be outliers with respect
to their operational efficiencies. The vertical line in the figure denotes a heat rate of 11,609 Btu per kWh. Five per-

101. Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer, Compensation Rules for Climate Policy in the
Electricity Sector, 27 J. Pol’y Anal. Mgmt. 819 (2008).
102. This analysis uses data on existing electricity-generating units in the lower 48
states during 2007. The population is based on units included in the Energy
Information Administration’s (EIA’s) Annual Energy Outlook 2009. For each
of these units, EPA databases provided additional information on efficiency.
Annual heat input, which is a measure of use, came from EPA’s Continuous
Emissions Monitoring Database for 2007. EPA calculates this information
for all emitting fossil-fired facilities greater than 25 MW by multiplying the
quantity of fuel used at a unit by the fuel’s heat content. Heat-rate data are
provided in EPA’s National Electric Energy Data System (NEEDS). The
most recent annual data available for NEEDS are from 2006. For both heat
inputs and heat rates, EPA reports data at the boiler level for steam units and
at the generator level for all other units. Observations that did not contain
data for both heat rate and heat input were dropped for this analysis.
		 To calculate CO2 emissions for each of the policy scenarios, we used
the national average emissions rates as given by Resources for the Future’s
electricity model, Haiku. The assumed rates are 116.6 pounds of CO2 per
million Btu for natural gas-fired units and 208.4 pounds of CO2 per million
Btu for coal-fired units. In addition, the scenario in which natural gas-fired
generation replaces inefficient coal-fired generation assumes that all generation is replaced by a natural gas plant with a 7,000 Btu/KWh heat rate,
which is the national average heat rate for natural gas.
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cent of total heat input (fuel use) at coal-fired power plants
occurs at units with a heat rate greater than this amount.
Figure 1. Coal Steam Units—Heat InputWeighted Heat Rates

Given that plant operators already face an incentive
through the cost of fuel to operate efficiently, one might
expect that the distribution of heat rates would have an
obvious technical explanation. One plausible explanation
is that performance characteristics may vary across technology, vintage, or fuel type. In the Appendix, we illustrate
that none of these factors appears to explain the distribution in heat rates across plants. The four most important
types of boilers—tangentially fired, wall-fired, cyclone,
and fluidized bed—share similar distributions of heat rates
and have similar right-hand tails. The least efficient units
have less control for SO2 than the fleet as a whole, but the
difference is not convincing. The least efficient units are
somewhat older than the fleet as a whole, but the distribution of vintage overlaps for the most part. And an important fraction of lignite and waste coal used nationally is
used at these least efficient units, but that accounts for only
a small portion of heat input at those units. Other coal
types are used much more extensively and in rough proportion to the national average.
Having considered technology, vintage, and fuel type as
potential explanations for the difference in operational efficiency at coal plants, one might also consider institutional
factors. One such factor is the prospect that modifications
to improve efficiency might trigger a permitting process
for NSR for other pollutants that could be time-consuming and costly (see Section III.C. above). Alternatively, the
state-level regulatory environment and the firm’s ownership
structure might provide different incentives for efficiency
improvements at different plants. Fuel-cost adjustment
clauses that allow for the automatic pass-through of fuel
cost into rates is another factor suggested by the NETL.103
Such provisions remove the risk from price fluctuations;
unfortunately, such provisions also may remove the incentive to harvest low-cost efficiency improvements. If institutional factors such as these play an important role in
perpetuating the operation of relatively inefficient facilities,
then performance standards might contribute to a remedy.
103. NETL, supra note 93.
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Performance standards focus attention on a specific metric
that can elevate its visibility within the firm and to regulators. A tradable performance standard should do even
better, by taking important steps toward a cost-effective
distribution of emissions reductions.
In summary, we find no obvious explanation for the
persistence of a right-hand tail in the distribution of heatrate efficiency among plants. Further investigation requires
statistical analysis that is not part of this Article.
An important element of the political debate regarding GHG policy is the potential regional distribution of
regulatory costs. Substantial interest has focused on the
disparity in the reliance on coal for electricity-generation
in different parts of the country. Figure 2 illustrates the
state-level average heat rate for generation from coal across
the continental United States. The darker-shaded states
have higher average heat rates, meaning that more coal is
used—and more CO2 emissions result—per unit of electricity generated. Note that regions of the country often
associated with heavy coal use—midwestern, Appalachian,
and southeastern states—are not those with the greatest
average heat rate. In the Appendix, we illustrate a similar
geographic pattern for the geographic distribution of the
least efficient plants.
Figure 2. State-Level Average Heat Rate Map

C.

Three Plausible Regulatory Scenarios

Based on this information on the possible improvements in
efficiency in the electric utility sector and the potential use
of cofiring of biomass, several alternative regulatory scenarios under the NSPS program are plausible for reducing
GHG emissions from the electric utility sector. The first
two options are performance-based options focused on
plant efficiency with no trading between plants. The third
option would establish required reductions in GHG emissions mobilized by a trading approach based on plausible
reductions from both energy-efficiency improvements and
the cofiring of biomass.
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Option 1. A plant-by-plant-mandated improvement
(reduction) in heat rate of 5% at coal-fired plants. Some
improvement at gas- and oil-fired plants might also be
required.
Option 2. A strict heat-rate efficiency-performance standard that specifies the minimum performance characteristics for coal-fired boilers. This familiar regulatory approach
under the CAA would require efficiency improvements or
shutdown for the 5% least efficient plants. To illustrate
its effects, we identify a standard applied to the operating
efficiency of coal-fired power plants set equal to the 95th
percentile of existing plants, or 11,609 Btu of heat input
per kWh of electricity production. If all plants with a heat
rate greater than this threshold were taken out of service,
it would result in a 5% reduction in emissions from coalfired generation. These plants generate 4.3% of electricity from coal; the difference (0.7%) reflects the relative
inefficiency of these plants. The vertical line in Figure 1
indicates the cutoff for a strict performance standard. The
actual emissions reductions that would be achieved would
hinge on the technology used to replace generation from
these facilities.104

An inflexible efficiency standard applied either as a strict
uniform reduction in heat rates (Option 1) or as a strict heatrate performance standard (Option 2) could be expected to
result in marginal costs of emissions reductions that would
vary across facilities. For example, the uniform standard
would require facilities that are already efficient to make
further efficiency improvements comparable to efforts at
inefficient facilities. Meanwhile, the strict heat-rate performance standard (Option 2) would target only the least efficient facilities, even though low-cost opportunities may be
available elsewhere in the fleet. Consequently, the cost of
such approaches would be greater than might be achieved
under a regulation that allowed flexibility across facilities
to achieve the same emissions reductions at least cost.
Option 3. A market-based approach requiring a roughly
10% reduction in CO2 emissions from coal-fired electricity-generation. The 10% is based on a fleetwide 5% reduction from energy-efficiency improvements at coal-fired
plants plus a 5% fleetwide reduction in CO2 emissions
with the cofiring of biomass. For a cap-and-trade system
administered at the national level, plants would receive
allowances based on generation in a year previous to the
start of a program. For a heat-rate-based program, the
metric would be fossil-fuel energy input (CO2 emissions
rate-adjusted) to kWh generation for the utility system.

A flexible standard for coal or a cap-and-trade program
(Option 3) could potentially capture even greater gains
if it were to allow for cofiring of coal with biomass. EPA
104. If the reduced generation were made up by non-emitting sources, the standard would achieve a 5% reduction overall. If it were made up by the average natural gas combined-cycle units, the standard would have to target the
least efficient 7.22% of heat input at coal plants (11,416 Btu per KWh). See
Appendix, for discussion.
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identifies emissions-reduction opportunities from cofiring of 2-5%, on average, across the fleet, in addition to
the 2-5% they identify from the heat-rate improvements
discussed above.105 However, the geographic opportunity
for biomass cofiring may be even more uneven than the
opportunities for efficiency improvements. The ability to
cofire depends in part on the configuration of the boiler
and, importantly, on the availability of local, low-cost biomass. A flexible efficiency standard calibrated to reduce
coal-heat input by 10% per unit of electricity generated by
coal could capture potential improvements in efficiency
and from biomass cofiring. The net effect on emissions
from the electricity sector would depend on whether this
led to greater use of some coal- or natural gas-fired facilities. However, a standard of this nature would be likely to
result in an overall emissions reduction of roughly 3% of
total U.S. CO2 emissions.
An investigation of the effects of a flexible performance
standard requires modeling that is beyond the scope of
this Article. Nonetheless, such an approach is a possible
outcome if EPA were to implement a standard for existing
emissions sources under §111(d). The Agency might identify an average heat-rate improvement that would apply
across the industry but allow flexibility in the implementation of the standard. Tradable performance standards
have been used previously under the CAA, including, for
example, in the phaseout of lead in gasoline.106 Such an
approach would be likely to capture relatively low-cost
opportunities for efficiency improvements by introducing
a price on CO2; thereby, such an approach is expected to
reduce the overall cost of the program. Flexible compliance options might lead to the retirement of some of the
least efficient plants, but it also would allow improvements
across the spectrum where it is least expensive to achieve
the overall industrywide performance standard.
The Appendix illustrates that similar opportunities may
exist in the fleet of natural gas turbines and steam natural
gas units, although these plants are used much less intensively than coal plants are. Turbine efficiency has benefited
from the aeronautic revolution in the 1980s, but many
turbines with heat rates more than double that of a new
turbine remain in service. Steam gas units also display a
right-hand tail in their distribution of heat-rate efficiency.
Although their heat rates are roughly comparable to the
rates at coal plants, the CO2 content per Btu of gas is less
than one-half of that for coal.
The most ambitious effort plausible under the NSPS
program would be a sectoral cap-and-trade program that
would allow trading across fuel types. To accomplish this,
the Agency would have to redefine the regulated emissions source category to include all fossil-fired electricitygenerating units or allow trading across existing-source
categories. An Energy Information Administration (EIA)
105. U.S. EPA, Technical Supporting Document for the ANPRM: Stationary Sources, supra note 92, at 16-17.
106. Richard G. Newell & Kristian Rogers, Leaded Gasoline in the United States:
The Breakthrough of Permit Trading, in Choosing Environmental Policy
(W. Harrington et al. eds., 2004).
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analysis of an economywide cap-and-trade program under
H.R. 2454 provides a useful indication of what might be
achieved from the electricity sector under a sectoral cap.107
By 2020, EIA projects that H.R. 2454 would achieve emissions reductions of 10.4% from coal-fired power plants
compared to 2009 levels.108 For the entire electricity sector,
emissions in 2020 would fall by 11.4% from their 2009
levels. This constitutes a 4.6% reduction in total national
emissions. The EIA modeling does not incorporate endogenous improvements in the operational efficiency of existing
units. Instead, those reductions occur from exogenous technological change, a shift in investments to lower emitting
sources of generation, and fuel-switching.109 In contrast,
the opportunities for emissions reductions from coal- and
gas-fired plants that we illustrate above are explicitly the
result of improvements in the operational efficiency of
existing units. If EPA were able to expand the definition of
source category to include all fossil-fired electricity-generating units, it should encourage emissions reductions from
operational efficiency as well as through fuel-switching.
Nonetheless, this comparison poses some questions for the
Agency. If opportunities for improvements in operational
efficiency remain available today given existing fuel prices,
could an increase in fuel prices resulting from an emissions
cap be expected to harvest those improvements? Would a
tradable performance standard capture different types of
emissions reductions than a cap-and-trade program?
In summary, substantial emission-reduction opportunities appear available from existing power plants under the
CAA §111(d) NSPS authority. Moreover, incentive-based
approaches that place an explicit price on CO2 should do a
better job of capturing emissions reductions than uniform,
strict performance standards.

V.

Conclusion

The CAA provides a well-known, long-standing, and
broadly effective set of regulatory tools. It has been sufficiently flexible to regulate a wide variety of pollutants
with diverse effects, physical characteristics, and roles in
the economy. Great skepticism has been expressed, however, about whether the CAA is up to the task of regulating
GHGs. Our analysis indicates that, at least in some limited
but meaningful ways, the statute remains a powerful and
flexible tool for this new challenge. Moreover, absent legislative intervention, regulation under the CAA will move
forward; ultimately, this regulation could achieve substantial emissions reductions.
107. EIA, Energy Market and Economic Impacts of H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, SR/OIAF/2009-05 (2009),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/hr2454/pdf/sroiaf(2009)05.pdf.
108. In the absence of the program, coal-fired power plant emissions would be
expected to grow by 12.5% from 2009 to 2020.
109. It also includes only limited demand-response because the change in electricity prices is small as a result of the free allocation to local distribution
companies. This probably resembles what could be achieved by a sectoral
program under the NSPS program. As noted above, EPA would not have
the authority to run an auction for emissions allowances, although if allocation decisions are delegated to the states, they could do so.
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To be sure, we are convinced that new legislation targeted
specifically at GHGs would be superior to an approach
based purely on the CAA. Because fossil-based energy is
such an important part of our economy, we need to move
away from it in a careful fashion. New legislation could
capture the lowest cost-emissions reductions via economywide carbon pricing and incorporate international offsets,
among many advantages over a CAA-only approach.
Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that even a modest
regulatory program using a well-worn and well-known
CAA pathway—the NSPS—is capable of producing real
reductions in emissions by targeting efficiency gains in the
coal-electricity sector.110 Incorporation of trading mechanisms into this NSPS approach is legally plausible, would
reduce costs, and would unlock further emissions cuts via
biomass cofiring or (slightly less plausibly) fuel-switching
from coal to natural gas.
Our analysis of just the one source category, coalfired electricity-generating units, indicates that an NSPS
approach including gains from coal-plant efficiency and
biomass cofiring could achieve reductions of roughly 3%
of total national emissions. It is worth noting that these
emissions reductions are associated with a relatively modest NSPS approach. CAA regulation that expands on a
narrow NSPS program by modifying source categories
or allows trading across source categories in the electricity sector to permit fuel-switching, for example, might be
able to capture significantly more emissions reductions. By
comparison, we infer from EIA analysis that an electricitysector cap comparable in stringency and cost to the Wax-

man-Markey analysis could achieve emissions reductions
of 11.4% in the electricity sector in 2020—a reduction
equal to 4.6% of total national emissions in 2009—with
a substantial portion of those reductions banked for compliance in future years.111 The greatest area of uncertainty
with a CAA NSPS approach is cost. Estimates of costs
would require a modeling exercise that is unfortunately
beyond the scope of this Article. Because the NSPS program we identify is relatively modest, capturing known
opportunities for emissions reduction (efficiency and biomass cofiring), it is our sense that costs are likely to be
modest as well. Costs will clearly be lower if NSPS regulation includes some form of trading.
To many observers, incentive-based approaches adopted
through new climate legislation are viewed as a discrete
alternative to prescriptive approaches that are common
under the CAA. But these alternatives may not be mutually exclusive. As we have discussed, various provisions of
the CAA offer opportunities to introduce flexibility—and
thereby to realize at least a portion of the potential cost savings associated with incentive-based approaches—though
an economywide emissions trading program created by
new legislation would reduce costs even further.
In short, this analysis leads us to conclude that the
CAA—and specifically, NSPS—despite being a suboptimal vehicle for GHG regulation, is nevertheless a knowable, practical, and effective one. Furthermore, until and
unless Congress passes new legislation, the CAA is the tool
we have. It appears that this tool remains very useful, even
if it cannot finish the job alone.

110. Further opportunities for emissions reductions exist in other sectors of the
economy beyond the electricity sector. For example, the figure stated above
does not include emissions reductions from the transportation sector associated with EPA’s regulations under other provisions of the CAA—regulations
that most comprehensive climate proposals in Congress leave intact.

111. See EIA, Energy Market and Economic Impacts of H.R. 2454, supra
note 107.
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Appendix
A.

Explaining the Variation in Heat Rates at CoalFired Boilers
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Figure 5. Coal Cyclone Boilers—Heat
Input-Weighted Heat Rates

One plausible explanation for the distribution of heat rates
is that performance characteristics may vary by technology.
Figures 3-6 illustrate the distribution of heat rates for
the four most important types of boilers: tangentially fired,
wall-fired, cyclone, and fluidized bed. These boilers exhibit
similar distributions of heat rates, so at a qualitative level,
technology does not appear to explain the distribution in
plant efficiency.
Figure 3. Coal Tangential Boilers—Heat
Input-Weighted Heat Rates
Figure 6. Coal Fluidized Bed—Heat
Input-Weighted Heat Rates

Figure 4. Coal Wall Boilers—Heat
Input-Weighted Heat Rates
Note: FBC, fluidized bed combustion.

Another possible explanation is that these outliers
represent older plants, perhaps smaller plants with lower
capacity-utilization rates. To investigate this, we plot the
distribution of heat input by vintage in Figure 7. The
curves in the top panel of the figure represent density distribution functions, and the area under the curves sum to
one. One curve represents the heat input-weighted distribution by vintage of 95% of existing coal-fired plants that
are relatively more efficient; the other curve represents the
distribution for the least efficient plants—those with a heat
rate above 11,609 Btu per kWh. Although both curves are
irregular, the curve representing heat input at the inefficient units appears to lie somewhat to the left of the distribution for all plants, indicating that these plants tend to be
older units.112 However, plants that are relatively inefficient
continued to be built throughout this time-horizon. The
bottom panel represents cumulative distribution functions.
Moving from left to right, the curves illustrate the portion
of plants in each category that are younger than a given
112. The vintage indicates the year of initial commercial operation.
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Table 1. Changes in Use of Coal-Fired Units by Fuel Type
All Units

Units with heat rates above 11,609 Btu/kWh

Coal type

Number of
units

Bituminous

489

750,968,640

37.39%

788,268,928

75

20,055,258

Bituminous &
subbituminous
Lignite

357

701,144,960

34.91%

746,669,568

64

5

14,029,976

0.70%

16,262,573

2

30

108,432,520

5.40%

122,885,184

2

4,852,081

4.47%

159

418,986,528

20.86%

462,743,072

23

20,273,054

4.84%

14,754,307

0.73%

16,793,920

6

2,643,915

17.92%

2,008,316,931

100%

2,153,623,245

86,271,044

4.30%

Lignite &
subbituminous
Subbituminous
Waste coal
TOTAL

28

Generation
(MWh)

Percentage of total
generation

CO2
emissions
(tons)

vintage. This figure illustrates that the less efficient plants
tend to be older, but 40% of the heat input at inefficient
plants occurs at plants that were built after 1975.
Figure 7. Coal Steam Boilers—Distribution of
Heat Rate by Vintage

Vintage
Least efficient units (5% of heat output)

All other units (95% of heat output)

NumPercentPercentber of Generation
age by
age of total
units
(MWh)
coal type generation

Least efficient units (5% of heat output)

All other units (95% of heat output)

Yet another factor that might explain the relative performance of plants could be the type of fuel available. Coals
vary according to moisture content and other measures of
quality. Table 1 describes the fuel-use characteristics of the
least efficient plants and indicates that the least efficient 5%
of generation uses a variety of coal types. The coal types
that are most affected are lignite (42% of total lignite used)

Percentage of
CO2
reduced

2.67%

23.25%

26,228,603

3.33%

32,573,522

4.65%

37.76%

41,028,115

5.49%

5,873,214

41.86%

6.81%

7,118,209

43.77%

5.62%

5,981,477

4.87%

23.50%

25,411,746

5.49%

3.06%

3,397,136

20.23%

100%

109,165,287

5.07%

and waste coal (18%), but these coal types account for only
a small portion of the total coal used among the facilities
that would be affected by the regulation—lignite represents only 7%, and waste coal only 3% of fuel use at the
least efficient generators. The remaining 90% of fuel used
is distributed proportionally according to the contribution
of each fuel to total generation.
Finally, we look at the existence of flue-gas desulfurization equipment (scrubbers). These post-combustion controls to reduce SO2 emissions cost hundreds of millions
of dollars, so one would expect them to be less common
at plants that are relatively inefficient. For the entire fleet,
about 61% of heat input occurs at units with post-combustion controls for SO2, whereas 35% of the fuel use at
the least efficient plants is at plants that have such equipment.113 This finding is consistent with expectations, yet it
is nonetheless surprising that more than one-third of the
least efficient generation occurs at units with SO2 controls.
Based on this qualitative analysis, no single simple factor explains the variation in heat rates across plants, and
particularly the surprising right-hand tail. Other factors—
including operational practice, general maintenance, or
the introduction of electronic-combustion controls in the
boiler—may explain lingering opportunities for improvements in plant efficiency as a way to reduce CO2 emissions
from electricity-generating units.

B.
Vintage

CO2
reduction
(tons)

The Geographic Distribution of Less Efficient
Generation at Coal-Fired Boilers

A standard requiring a uniform 5% improvement in
heat rate at every plant (Option 1) would have a diffuse
effect across the nation. Figure 8 illustrates where emissions reductions would occur, represented as a fraction of
total electricity-generation to indicate where the reduction
would be a relatively important part of overall electricity113. A little more than one-half of the heat input at the least efficient units that
have SO2 controls in place is at units with wet scrubbers. Among all units
with SO2 controls, wet scrubbers are in place for more than 86% of the
heat input.
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generation. This view makes it appear that the burden of
such a standard would be distributed in a fairly uniform
way across the country. Clearly, such an approach would
not be cost-effective, because a strict uniform reduction in
heat input that was not tradable would not take advantage
of opportunities at plants that currently are least efficient
and could be expected to have the least-cost opportunity to
reduce emissions. Moreover, it would require the same percentage reductions in heat input at the most efficient plants,
even though these plants may already have exhausted all
cost-effective opportunities for reductions.
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the greatest burden of emissions reductions under a strict
performance standard would occur elsewhere.
Figure 9. Coal Plants—Strict 5% Greater
Efficiency Performance Standard

Figure 8. Coal Plants—Uniform 5% Efficiency
Improvement

A strict efficiency performance standard might specify
a maximum heat rate for coal-fired boilers. A standard set
equal to the 95th percentile of existing plants would be
set at 11,609 Btu per kWh. The vertical line in Figure 1
indicates the cutoff for a strict performance standard; the
plants to the right of this line with heat rates in excess of
11,609 Btu per kWh are those represented in Figure 9. The
scale in this figure represents the heat input that would be
reduced in each state, divided by the total electricity-generation in that state. This scale illustrates the degree to which
the reduction in heat input represents an important part
of overall electricity-generation in the state. Much of the
generation that would be affected is located in the upper
plains states. South Dakota is the outlier, with a value of
nearly 4,000 Btu per kWh of total electricity-generation.
Although Figure 2 and Figure 8 illustrate that coal-fired
generation is not a large share of electricity-generation in
the state compared with other states, Figure 9 indicates that
the state hosts a relatively large share of inefficient plants.
The next state that would be most affected is Wyoming,
with a value of approximately 3,000 Btu per kWh, and
other states in the upper plains also would be affected. So,
although most of the coal used for electricity-generation is
consumed east of the Mississippi River, and the state with
the greatest total quantity of coal-fired generation is Texas,

A strict heat-rate efficiency performance standard could
have consequences. If electricity-generation were reduced
from the least efficient coal-fired facilities, it might be
replaced by an increase at other emitting facilities. Natural
gas-fired generation is the second-most-important form of
electricity-generation after coal and is expected to grow in
the future, especially in light of emerging climate policy.
To achieve the 5% net emissions reductions, assuming that
all reductions in generation are made up by an increase in
generation at the average natural gas combined-cycle power
plant, the performance standard for coal-fired generation
would be set at 11,416 Btu per kWh, directly affecting 7.22%
of the heat input at the least efficient coal-fired plants. Figure 10 illustrates that the states in the upper plains region
remain most directly affected by such regulation.
Figure 10. Coal Plants—Strict 7.2% Greater
Efficiency Standard
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A brief look at the distribution of natural gas-fired electricity-generation illustrates a similar distribution of operational efficiency. Figure 11 illustrates the distribution for
natural gas turbines. In this case, heat-rate efficiency is
likely to be closely related to vintage. Facilities built since
the aeronautic revolution in turbines in the 1980s are more

efficient and more heavily used. There is relatively little
opportunity to improve a specific turbine, short of complete refurbishment, and most turbines are used only for
peak-period generation and have relatively few emissions
overall. Figure 12 illustrates the operational efficiency of
steam natural gas units, many of which have greater heat
input than the average turbine and offer greater technical
opportunities for efficiency improvements.

Figure 11. Natural Gas Turbine—Heat InputWeighted Heat Rates

Figure 12. Natural Gas Steam—Heat InputWeighted Heat Rates

C.

Variation in Natural Gas-Fired Plant Efficiency
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